How France Was Betrayed In 1940

"Inside" Stories of the War

JJ/HY did France collapse so easily in ** June, 1940? We know that there was treachery in high places, that the liberty-loving masses of France were most foully betrayed to the Hun : but who did the betraying, and why? Why did France not elect to fight on in the Mediterranean area, with characteristic high courage, rather than make the shameful armistice with Hitler?

Only now, after two years, are we being given a solution of one of the outstanding mysteries of the war. The man who did more than any other to betray his country to Germany was Maxime Weygand, who was made Commander-in-Chief in the blackest days of May, 1940 ( when Gamelin was dis missed) ; and who forthwith abandoned the Belgians, quarrelled with the British, and allied himself with Petain and Laval in the Vichy Government.

The full story has been told recently by two or three well-informed writers.

For the material in the following article we are indebted mainly to a chapter in a fascinating new book, “That Day Alone”, by Pierre van Paassen, author of “Days of Our Years”.

WEYGAND was the outstanding mili tary strategist of 1918, and the chief collaborator of Marshal Foch, architect of the Allied Victory. But he was distrusted and disliked by Clemen ceau, guardian of French democracy, who described him as “the most danger ous of the clerical-military clique”.

Other eminent French Generals were made Marshals. Weygand was not; and he was placed on the retired list as soon as he was 65.

“Monarchist, anti-Semite, contemp tuously anti-British, with important connections in the world of finance and industry,’’ Weygand became an assiduous attendant at meetings of the French Fascist party, Croix de Feu, led by Colonel de la Rocque. The latter was a fellow Director with Weygand on Paris Gas and Electricity.

Later, both Weygand and Petain were closely associated with a Fascist organi sation called Cagoulards, which was strongly anti-Jewish. Members wore a hood. The Cagoulards caused disturb ances in Paris in 1938, Weygand’s name was uncovered by the police investi gation—and Weygand was immediately sent off to Syria to re-organise the armies of the Levant.

IT now is known that Weygand did not take the job seriously. He made one tour of inspection, and he had one conference with the British Middle East Commander, General Wavell (in January, 1940); otherwise, except for brief periods of two or three weeks, he spent most of his time in Paris. Yet, in those critical days of late 1939 and early 1940, we all imagined Weygand to be busy in the Middle East, organising the defence of Syria, Egypt and the Suez Canal.

The January, 1940, conference was amazing. Wavell proposed a pooling of Franco-British resources in the Middle East, and a transfer of some of France’s best combat troops from Syria to meet the Axis threat from Libya—it was obvious, even then, that Germany’s plan was to bring Italy into the war, and then use Libya as a springboard against Egypt and Suez. Wavell argued that

Egypt was in greater danger than Syria.

“To the amazement of the British staff officers, Weygand hotly disputed General Wavell’s allegations that Musso lini had anything but the best intentions towards France. There was no reason to suppose, he said, that Mussolini in tended to throw in his lot with Berlin.

“The British officers, who knew no better than that the mobs in the Italian cities were clamouring for Tunisia, Nice, Savoy, Djibouti, and Corsica (all of them" French, not British possessions) were stupefied to hear the French Com mander dismiss these chauvinistic out breaks in Italy as insignificant demon strations by irresponsible elements.

“Weygand further claimed to have positive information from his friends, Pierre Laval and Francois Poncet, the French Ambassador to Rome, that the Duce harboured no evil intentions against France. The upshot was that further discussions of close Franco- British collaboration in the Near East were dropped. Thereafter, when Wey gand had occasion to refer to military operations in the Near East, he spoke in downright scurrilous terms of General Wavell and his staff. But he made these contemptuous declarations in Paris, for he remained in the Near East but for brief periods of two and three weeks.

“Most of General Weygand’s time as Commander-in-Chief of France’s Near Eastern forces was spent in France, where he carried on a frenzied cam paign for a declaration of war against ... the Soviet Union! He urged that an expedition be sent to Norway to strike at the Soviet Union in the neighbour hood of Murmansk; and, simultaneously, that an attack be launched in the Caucasus and the Crimea. The French Navy was to sail up the Aegean, through the Dardanelles and the Hellespont, bombard Odessa, and land an expedi tionary force on Russia’s Black Sea shores.

WHAT was his aim in abandoning his important post in the Near East, where France was menaced as much as Britain (for the Suez Canal is the gateway to the French Far Eastern possessions as much as it is England’s and Holland’s road to their Asiatic Em pire), and come to Paris to engage in political intrigue and create even more dissension in French councils?”

All France recognised the immense and imminent danger that lay in the massing of German armies in the West, in early spring of 1940. Yet here was France’s greatest known strategist urg ing the diversion of France’s forces against Russia, which in no way threat ened France.

Pierre van Paassen insists that Wey gand and his friends feared democracy, and democracy’s rising power against established interests, far more than they feared Hitler. They were prepared to attack Russia, and Russia’s new political order, if thereby they could gain the friendship and protection of the Ger mans. They preferred the Nazis of Germany to the Popular Front of France.

FRANCE fell because she was politically rotten. But the decay was not in the hearts of the French masses.

We must look farther, and deeper. Says van Paassen;— “The world has heard, ad infinitum, that the defeat of France must be attri buted to inner disruption, to the fact that the people were split into opposing political groups, to the growth of pacifism and the spirit of international ism, or even —most cynical lie of all — to a growth of luxury and indolence among the French masses. Discord there unquestionably was, but that dis

cord did not manifest itself in the French masses.

“There was not ,a single anti-war de monstration in Paris, or in any of the metropolitan centres of the provinces— not even in the municipalities that con stituted the so-called Ted belt’ around the capital. Not a single political party voted against war credits.

“It is not true, either, as it is so often alleged, that the Communists sabotaged France’s war effort. One has only to consult Winston Churchill’s ‘STEP BY STEP’, to learn what attitude the French Communists took, and how the British Prime Minister lauded their patriotism and included them amongst the best soldiers of France. No, the crux lay elsewhere.

“It was Weygahd and Laval, Petain

and Flandin, Baudouin and Bonnet, who sabotaged the French war effort. It was the French General Staff and the officers’ corps, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and the trust magnates and utility directors who were afraid to fight Hitler.

“Not that they were afraid of being defeated. They were afraid that the phenomenal Gallic fury, the revolutionary fervour of the French people, would, once the country was seriously menaced, gain the upper hand and not only hurl back the Nazi hordes, but run over into the Reich and liberate the German people from the spiritual and physical tyranny of Fascism. They were afraid of victory.

“They did not want to see Herr Hitler, the man who had vowed to eradicate de mocracy, eliminated. They hated demo

cracy as much as he. They considered democracy—and rightly so—a greater threat than Hitler to their own class hegemony in French society.”

THE story, thenceforward, is but too well known. The Huns, in May and June, smashed into Holland and Belgium: and, to the amazement of the world, they poured through the un guarded Ardennes frontier of France (west of the Maginot Line) and over ran northern France. French resistance was feeble, fumbling, ill-directed. A terrified and quarrelling French Govern ment sacked Commander-in-Chief Game lin, and sent for—Weygand and Retain!

Do you remember, in those black May days of 1940, how all we ill-informed newspaper commentators cheered? Now (we said) we shall see a change. The Victor of Verdun and the brilliant Wey gand will alter this picture. How little we guessed that France had been handed over to . a gang of pro-German arch-

Fascists! Let van Paassen proceed:— “From Syria, Weygand returned helter skelter by aeroplane on May 17, 1940, when Paul Reynaud had taken over the reins of government from Edouard Daladier, and after the German armies had broken through the Dutch and Belgian defences.

“Reynaud had announced that the military situation was grave, but by no means desperate. Moreover, he an nounced, General Weygand had now taken command: Weygand, the man of mystery, who had helped Foch win his phenomenal successes, the man who, when the Bolsheviks were in the suburbs of Warsaw, had shown by a mere stroke of the pen, on the maps of the Polish general staff, the way in which the Red Army could be rolled back. . . .

“This General Weygand, who, to the knowledge of every informed man in France .looked upon defence against Germany as a waste of effort, because Russia, not Hitler, was the real enemy, in his eyes; who held the French Re public, and republican institutions, in execration; who was a member of the Academic Francaise, which was a centre of pro-German and pro-Italian elements, that held victory over the Germans un desirable, and dictatorship the perfect form of social order, as opposed to ‘democratic decadence’; who, moreover, was one of the animating spirits in a Fascist organisation openly calling for collaboration with Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe, and which, through its news papers, had more than once suggested that it might become advisable to call in Adolf Hitler to establish order in France (that is, to crush the democracy that the native French Fascists had not been able to crush); this General Wey gand was entrusted with the sole re sponsibility of defending France against the German onslaught in May, 1940!”

WEYGAND made a quick inspection of the front, and then flew to Ypres, where he met General Lord Gort (British Commander), Leopold 111 and General Michiels, in charge of the Belgian armies; and General Bilotte, in command of the French Army in Bel gium. He began by quarrelling with the British over the technique of their with drawal in Belgium.

King Leopold explained the military situation. According to one of those present, the King expressed himself with moderation and ereat restraint, but he pointed out to Weygand that whereas the Belgians and the British were fight ing heroically and were making enor mous sacrifices, the French were falling back without giving battle at a single spot. The King remarked; “The French have fallen back 250 kilometres (about 155 miles) in seven days. . . . My army has suffered enormous losses in cover ing the French retreat, but these opera tions will be absolutely futile if the French do not make a stand. We can not go on holding the entire German army alone. Why do not the French stop retreating when the enemv has not even made contact with them?”

General Gort supported the King, but used more vigorous language.

Leopold then offered to take over the line held by the 16 th French Army Corps, which stood on the left wing of the Belgians in the Dutch province of Zeeland, “but Monsieur Weygand politely refused that generous offer”.

Within an hour of that conference the 16th French Army Corps received orders to fall back, without having fired a shot, and leaving the British and Belgians to withstand the German onslaught alone.

The general military situation, bad be fore. now was thrown into hopeless confusion, and there began the debacle which ended in the surrender of France.

“Weygand,” says van Paassen, “was

plaving his own game. He had the reins in his hands at last, and he was steer ing the French Republic toward the harbour into which he had wanted to steer her for a long time . .

With Weygand supporting him, in the Cabinet, was the ancient Retain, mythical hero of Verdun—who had urged the surrender of France in 1917 and again in 1918.

THE French Government, led now by Reynaud (“a vain little parvenu”), made a plan to fight the Germans in a series of delaying actions, on four successive river lines, so as to give the army time to embark, and continue the war from northern Africa. Then the Government moved from Pans to Tours, on June 10. ‘‘When this plan was brought to the attention of Weygand, at Tours, on June 13 in a Cabinet meeting, both he and Petain immediately vetoed it. One who was present at that session has declared that the attitude of General Weygand not only surprised the Cabinet members, but ‘filled every man present with stupe faction’. Their stupefaction turned to silent horror when Weygand in icy tones mentioned capitulation.

“The General was asked if, m his opinion, the military situation had de generated to such a point that no other course of action was left. It was then that he gave the answer that unmasked him and his intentions. Tt is not the military situation that is so bad’, he re plied. ‘But if you gentlemen do not ask for an armistice, there will be Communism in France’.”

There was argument. Then and there, certain Ministers put through telephone calls to Paris, and gathered information to prove that nowhere was there a sign of Communist risings or unrest.

“Nevertheless, both Weygand and Petain resumed their pressure on Rey naud to bring the war to a quick con clusion. After hours of deliberation, it was decided to move the seat of govern ment to Bordeaux the moment the Ger mans should reach Chartres.

“Before moving, the Cabinet had an other session. When Weygand was not present, President Lebrum seemed to agree that the best course would be to move over to Africa, save the fleet and the colonies, and continue the fight on England’s side. But the moment Wey gand made his reappearance, and began insisting again that France capitulate before exasperating Hitler by her re sistance, and making the Fuehrer s armistice conditions more severe, Lebrum weakened. Still, he insisted that he wanted the consent of the British Gov ernment to an armistice. . . .

WHEN the Government reached Bor deaux on June 14, it was found that a rump Parliament was in session. It was headed by Pierre Laval and was made up of all the appeasers, the anti-British elements in high politics, and the other friends of Hitler and Mussolini. They gathered in the office of Adrien Marquet, Mayor of Bordeaux, a Fascist stalwart of long standing.

“For a few hours, which seemed inter minable, the debate raged between these groups and the members of the regular Government as to what course to pursue.

Reynaud was still in favour, then, of heading for Africa, and several of his Ministers had already set out for the trans-marine colonies to get things in readiness. Among them were Georges Mandel and Edouard Daladier. These men were later arrested and, among other things, charged with desertion by the supreme deserters, Petain and Wey

gand.”

AND now comes a most interesting and dramatic development. The Fascists, Weygand and Detain, had almost won their battle for surrender when Great Britain entered upon the scene, on June 14. Her envoys were Lord Lloyd (personal friend of Winston Churchill), General Spears, and Mr.

Alexander Union. They arrived by plane from England, and were immediately brought into the presence of President Lebrum, the Cabinet Ministers, the pre sidents of the Chamber and the Senate, General Weygand, and Marshal Petain.

Churchill’s now famous offer was sub mitted. Britain proposed an immediate union of the British and French Em pires; Britain would send every available boat, protected by warships, to assist the French in removing a great section of the French army to Africa; Britain and France would use all the resources of their mighty Empire in continuing the war.

“The debate resumed once more: the Government sitting in the Bordeaux pre fecture, Laval and his satellites in the City Hall, with Weygand serving as go between and military adviser to both groups.

“Laval and his friends were for break ing off the British alliance at once, for setting up an anti-democratic Govern ment in unoccupied France, and for entering into negotiations with the Ger mans with a view to bringing France eventually into the Axis combination.

Reynaud favoured transferring the Gov ernment to London, to accept the British offer of union, and to evacuate the army to Africa.

“The three British representatives re mained in constant touch with the Government, and on June 15 they were asked to submit their propositions once more, this time in writing. When they delivered their document to the Cabinet, Weygand received it from the hands of General Spears. As he took the papers, Weygand remarked: ‘This is the offer to France to give up her independence and become a British Dominion’.

“The British took the insult calmly and withdrew to allow the Cabinet to deliberate. For a few hours the majority seemed to have been in favour of ac cepting the British plan.

THEN Weygand, who had gone to fetch Laval, reappeared and began to expostulate on the impossibility of withdrawing the French army. Rey naud, hearing this, again began to waver.

“Someone said to Laval: ‘But if you accept the German conditions, you con nive at the total collapse of France for at least fifty years’.

“To which Laval returned; ‘That is true, but we shall at last be able to take the working-class in hand’.

“‘With Germany?’ asked the diplomat, who had spoken first. ‘With Germany against the French people?’

“ ‘With Germany to eradicate the pestilence’, Laval came back.

“Thereupon, Paul Reynaud resigned, and Marshal Petain agreed to head the Ministry. Petain named Weygand his first assistant, and the advocates of com plete capitulation and collaboration with Fascist Germany were at last in the saddle.” * * * The subsequent story of “the Men of Vichy” does not need recapitulation.

Without actually going to war, these French Fascist Anglophobes have assisted Hitler in many ways against Britain.

They opened a road through Tunisia for German reinforcements going to Libya; they actually fought the British in Syria; and, even as this is being written (July 3) they are arranging that the French fleet, immobilised by the British

in Alexandria two years ago, shall “fall into the hands” of the victorious Rommel.

Dr. Anthony J. Borg, Medical Officer in the Fiji Civil Service, is at present spending long leave in New Zealand. He has been a member of the Medical Department since 1916.

Private F. Bannigan, formerly of Wau, New Guinea, who now is serving in the Australian Army Medical Corps, was very ill at an Australian military camp in June, but he recovered sufficiently well early in July to have his name removed from the Army’s official “seri ously ill” list.