Why Hitler Attacked Russia Last June

Inside Stories of the War

JJ/HY did Stalin, on August 23, 1939, enter the Nazi-Soviet pact, and thus administer a never-to-be-forgotten shock to the civilised world? Why did Russia remain silent and aloof while Germany. ™Y der f. d Czechoslovakia and Poland, j.+ y did Russia seize Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bessarabia, Bukowina, and attack Finland? Why, despite that Pact ?f Au F ust ’ 1939 ; did Hitler, on June 22, 1941, hurl all his military strength upon Russia?

These things did not seem to make sense, and every war student has asked those questions. Kenneth S. Davies, a competent writer on foreign affairs, has contributed to “Current History” (pub lished in New York) an explanation which seems to fit convincingly into the outline of the events of 1939-1942.

ONE of the certainties of our world had been the Implacable hostility of Communist Russia and Nazi Ger many. Between two such divergent ideologies there could be no possible com promise. Stalin would never make a deal with Hitler.

And yet it happened—and at a moment of intense crisis. Stalin, it would seem had taken a leaf from Chamberlain’s notebook. He had become of all things an “appeaser” suddenly doing an about face in his strategy, and making of Cham berlain’s foreign policy a boomerang—‘‘to save the Soviet Union”. Cynically delib erately, Stalin turned his back on “collec tive security” and pushed the world over the brink of the precipice—“to save the

Soviet Union”. This was the obvious, if incredible, interpretation; this is how things looked on the surface.

For two years we have been asked to believe that Stalin, who as head of the Communist Party was among the first to draw the attention of the doubting na tions of the West to the world threat of Fascism, who argued with irrefutable logic against policies of “appeasement”, and who had only a few years before purged the Russian Communist Party and the Russian Army of allegedly pro- Nazi elements, became all of a sudden as incredibly stupid as Chamberlain and proceeded to build a gallows for his own hanging.

This does not explain the facts and in deed is no real analysis at all. Why should the German strategists choose to attack Russia while they were still busy with Britain, and the United States was just over the horizon? The German High Command* must have been aware of the tremendous actual and potential fighting strength of the Soviet Union. The usual answer is the blanket assertion that Hitler “wants Russian oil and wheat and wants to make his rear secure before he starts his last great assault upon the British Isles”.

Apparently we have made no serious attempt to understand the choice that Stalin was forced to make in 1939. We must begin with the assumption that Hitler meant what he said in “Mein Kampf”, namely, that he does intend to conquer the entire world. Recent history certainly justifies this assumption. We must also assume that Stalin was well aware of Hitler’s intentions long before the rest of the world’s leaders took the German Fuehrer with the requisite seriousness.

This assumption, too, is certainly jus tified by the history of the last decade.

We must remember that the Communists fought Fascism more consistently than any other organized group, all through the 1930’5. They joined in the Popular Front in France; they helped China against Japan and they—almost alone among left-wingers—fought and died for their principles in the armies of Loyalist Spain. The Soviet Union, as all the world knows, went “all out” for collective security against Fascist aggression as an inter national policy, WHAT was the situation, then, in August, 1939? (1) The policy of collective security had failed to gain practical results rapidly enough to justify its continuance in the face of an immediate Fascist threat. It had failed, not because of Russia’s lack of zeal or good faith, but because of the unalterable opposition of the leaders of the Western democracies. (2) Those leaders, whose basic strategy for the last six years had been to use Fascism as a buffer against Communism and to employ Hitler as a tool to crush the Soviet Union, still dominated their governments. The men of Munich were still in charge Chamberlain, Daladier,

and their “appeaser” supporters. These men and governments could obviously not be counted upon to give Russia effective aid in case Russia were attacked. They were psychologically unprepared to do so. (3) They were also physically unpre pared to do so. France was torn by in ternal dissension; there were many in high places who preferred Hitlerism to the making of needed social and economic adjustments within France; and French military leaders, as all the world knew, were preparing to fight only a purely defensive war behind their Maginot line.

Britain—weak in planes and mechanized equipment, and with productive capacities at a relatively low ebb—was unprepared to defend herself adequately, much less give active aid to Poland and Russia. (4) On the other hand, Germany was totally prepared for war, and she was determined that it begin in the summer of 1939. Her diplomatic strategy in the developing Polish crisis was, naturally, to keep her enemies as few and as divided as possible; but if Britain and France backed up their promise to aid Poland in case of Germany’s aggression in Poland it was of small importance. Hitler and the German High Command were well aware that neither France nor Britain would have any effect whatsoever on the military results in Poland. The question was not whether the war was to come that vear or not, but rather, whether the initial drive was to be against Russia or against the Western democracies after Poland was crushed, as she certainly would be in a few weeks. If Hitler was to conquer the world he must crush both Russia and the Western democracies.

His decision now in 1939 will be based upon his weighing of relative costs. Will it cost more to take on Russia now, or later, after the democracies are crushed? (5) Russia, then, stood alone against the tremendous weight of Hitler, aided probably by Finland, almost certainly by the Central European countries and Italy (if needed), and (something we must not forget) by an armed and eager Japan ready to pounce at the first favourable opportunity on Russia’s rear. Against such tremendous odds, what were Stalin’s chances of victory in case he were, at that moment, attacked? The national boundaries drawn in the Treaty of Ver sailles left Leningrad in an exposed posi tion only twenty miles from the fortified Finnish border. The Ukraine is hard to defend against highly mobile mechanized forces. The Russian heavy goods industry had probably not at that time produced war materials in anything like sufficient quantity to balance those of Hitler — much less a Hitler allied with Finland, Central Europe, Italy, and Japan. In short, the Russian chances for victory, in case of an immediate attack of such enormous weight, were slight indeed. rESE, it seems, are the hard, cold facts, requiring “realistic analysis”, that Stalin faced in August, 1939. It is absurd to assume that Stalin placed any faith whatsoever in the permanent efficacy of an “appeasement” policy— though it was naturally to his interest to make Hitler think that he did so.

In view of the assumptions and facts presented here, the logical conclusion is that Stalin was well aware that, sooner or later, Hitler would attack the Soviet Union. But if the attack came soon, Russia was certain to lose —and probably in a relatively short time. France and Britain, far from aiding Russia, would probably have been willing to lend at least passive support to Hitler in a drive to the east.

And after Hitler had conquered Russia what then? With Russian wheat and Russian oil, with a not inconsiderable Russian heavy goods industry ready for his organisation, and able now to turn

almost his entire force to the west, Hitler would have been immeasurably stronger than before. He would have been well on his way to world conquest.

In view of all this, there is no reason to assume that Stalin's decision of August, 1939, was selfishly nationalistic; it can more logically be interpreted as an international policy, designed to strengthen the chances of Socialism in all countries.

WHAT has been the role of Soviet Russia since August 23, 1939? (1) After the collapse of Poland, Russia (to show that she meant business and that she was ready to face Hitler with a stronger force than Britain and France at that time presented) occupied Western Poland. Hitler, unwilling to risk a costly and possibly lengthy conflict on the eastern front, which would give Britain and France a chance to prepare their own defence, took heed of the warning. (2) Russia then proceeded to correct those sections of the Treaty of Versailles which had obviously been designed to weaken Russian defence. After attempts* to negotiate with Finland for the recti fication of the Finnish frontier failed, partly because of British support of Fin land (which, in view of Finland’s close connections with Hitler Germany, seems to constitute evidence of the continuance of British “appeasement” and anti-Soviet

policies), Russia rectified her boundaries by force. (3) Russia bent every effort on war production, suspended temporarily the seven-hour day, strengthened the armies on her western border, and did what she could to sabotage (internally and through export failures) the Hitler war effort. (4) In the spring of 1941, Stalin offered Japan a non-aggression pact, which Japan accepted as a triumph of her own diplomacy and which the Western demo cracies accepted as further indication that Russia was becoming an integral part of the Axis. Japan, we were told, was now given a free hand to the south; she could move against the Netherland East Indies without fear of Russian attack (as if she might not have done so before).

Russia indicated at once, however, that her trade arrangements with unoccupied China were not affected by the treaty with Japan. It seems especially signifi-

£ a v Ma tsuoka entered into his pact Wn.ifu lll^ 11 his way home from Berlin, tom done that if Hit ler had h ir n that the Soviet Union was to be rpiP_ n ® x t victim of German aggression? is. a question that should be con- Sia^ ec L ln J ., any analysis of recent events. n ?y the summer of 1941, Russia is completely on a war footing. It appears to the Soviet leaders that the policy of stalling off Hitler has reached a point of diminishing returns, so far as Russia is concerned; continued longer, the policy will reduce rather than increase Russia’s relative strength. By forcing the Issue now, Stalin can force Hitler to fight— and for the first time in a serious way on two fronts. The British war effort, actively supported by the United States, is beginning to be effective in the west (m the air) and in the Near East and North Africa (in the air and on land) Unless Britain is knocked out soon (which she may be unless a diversion of Hitler’s

forces is effected) she will inevitably become relatively stronger and stronger.

Accordingly, Stalin makes his decision’ now is the time for the inevitable war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Ger- S a ? y o?'i- s Stalin ’ s decision, not Hitler’s it is Stalin who masses troops and war materials, as though preparing for attack probably it is Stalin who spreads rumours and creates psychological tension between Nazi-dominated Europe and the Soviet Union Almost certainly it is Stalin who iets the world know that by August he wdl be ready to attack. Very probably this is bait for Hitler. As the last and crown ing achievement of his foreign policy Stalin sees to it that it is Hitler (striving to claim the tactical advantage of “sur prise”) who breaks the Nazi-Soviet Pact —not Russia; thus he keeps intact Russia s reputation for never breaking her treaties.

SURELY Soviet policy has gained rather than lost. The Soviet Union has gained two powerful allies —the British Empire and the United States, neither of whom was either powerful in a military way or willing to act as a Russian ally in 1939. Japan, by a most brilliant stroke of diplomacy was at least temporarily immobilized at Russia’s rear.

And Russia herself is far better prepared to wage war than she was in 1939 In other words, the Soviet foreign policy stirred Britain and the United States to efforts they would certainly not have made had they continued to think that they could use Russia to pull their chest nuts out of the fire for them, or that they might crush both Stalin and Hitler by driving them against each other—and Japan was sent in groggv confusion to a neutral corner (for a little while).

One can swallow the commonly ac cepted analysis only by assuming at the outset that Stalin is both a monster of iniquity and a fool. Though he mav be the former (opinions vary on that), there is no evidence whatsoever that he is the latter. It is possible that when the final history of this great world crisis is writ ten, Stalin will stand out as the man who saved the civilized world, in spite of it self, through one of the most brilliant pieces of strategy that has ever been employed by a national leader during an international conflict.

THIS is a possibility. There is the al ternative possibility that no en lightened history of this period will be written for centuries—for it mav be that, in spite of everything, Hitler will win.

Frankly, this writer believes that Hitler cannot win in any final sense, but his victory in the present conflict with Russia —if he achieves it—is certainlv not to be taken as evidence of a “mistaken strategy” on Stalin’s part. Because of that very strategy, Stalin has a better chance to win now than he had in 1939; and if he loses now, he would most certainly have lost then.