The news magazine of the South Pacific · since 1930

Pacific Islands Monthly, 17 April 1942Vol. XII, No. 9

Guinea Area

pp. 11-12 · Read in the full issue

Japan’S Real Position In New

Their Hold Appears Precarious They Must be Reinforced, or Get Out

(Adapted from a Radio Address, by R. W. Robson, Broadcast by ABC)

ACCORDING to published reports, the places in the New Guinea region now occupied by Japanese are:— Rabaul, at the eastern end of New Britain; Gasmata, on the south coast of New Britain; Finschhafen, at the eastern extremity of the mainland; Lae and Salamaua, on the coast of the mainland, facing Huon Gulf; Kavieng, on the northern tip of New Ireland; Buka, a small island between New Ireland and Bougainville; Kieta, a tiny settlement with a good port, on the coast of the large island of Bougainville; Lorengau, a small port on the island of Manus (Admiralty Group), north-west from New Britain.

Faisi, in the Northern Solomons; Santa Cruz, between Solomons and New Hebrides.

In nearly every one of these places, including Rabaul itself, the Japanese are confronted with a hinterland of steep mountains, impenetrable jungles and un developed interior. There are a million primitive natives in New Guinea, but those who produce foodstuffs for them selves are mostly in the inaccessible in terior of the various islands. Those who live on the coastal fringes, near the places occupied by the Japanese, have depended mostly for their foodstuffs upon the European coconut planters, to whom they sold their services as labourers.

In other words, there are no supplies of foodstuffs, except coconuts, available to the Japanese in New Guinea; with the possible exception of New Ireland, they cannot penetrate into the interiors of any of the islands without an effort that would not be commensurate with any possible gain; their supplies, in cluding foodstuffs, must be brought over long distances presumably, from the Carolines; and they clearly are subject to increasingly violent attacks from Aus tralian air forces now soundly based on Papua and Northern Australia, and from Australian jungle fighters who know the country in a way that can only be learned through long years of hard experience.

Those who know New Guinea well are strongly of opinion that the Japanese cannot remain as they are —they must either pour new forces into New Guinea and advance southwards to Papua and Australia, or perhaps south-eastwards to wards the Solomons, Fiji, and New Zealand; or they must retire from New Guinea. We soon shall know.

In all the other territories which the Japanese have occupied—especially the Philippines, Malaya, Borneo and the Dutch East Indies—the invaders have penetrated deeply into the interior, have lived upon the country and are even now digging themselves in deeply in order to defend themselves against the expected attacks by the Allies.

But in the New Guinea Territory, with the possible exception of New Ireland, the invaders can do no more than hang on to the coastal fringe.

Mountain Ramparts

THE mainland of New Guinea, and the islands of New Britain and Bougain ville in particular, are defended by ramparts of mountains, which present to

the narrow coastal strip and to the sea, an almost impenetrable tangle of jungles and ravines, rocky escarpments and raging torrents —country so wild and broken that it has to be seen to be believed. . , Except on the goldfields of the Bulolo Valley, on the mainland of New Guinea, there has been no development whatever in the interior of those islands and, al though the miners of the Bulolo area tried for fifteen years to devise some cheaper means of land transport, by mule tracks or similar means through the mountains, the fact remains that right up until the moment of Japanese occu pation, the only method of communication between the coast and the Bulolo towns of Wau, Edie Creek, Bulolo and Bulwa, in the interior, was by means of aero planes. If those tough and experienced miners of New Guinea could not find a track through from the Bulolo to the coast, what chance have the Japanese?

That Markham Valley

THE persistent newspaper reports that the Japanese advance up the Mark ham Valley is part of a plan for advancing through the interior of New Guinea upon Papua and Port Moresby, may be completely discounted.

The Markham Valley runs away from Lae, to the north-west, and has no strategic value. If the Japanese want to go from Salamaua or Lae towards Papua, they must travel southwards, along the coasts of the main island. They cannot march overland. The Bulolo Valley lies, roughly, southwards of the Markham, between the Markham Valley and Papua, and there is no practicable military track through the ranges between the Markham and the Bulolo Valley.

The purpose of the Japanese advance of 27 miles up the Markham Valley from Lae, probably was not to establish new aerodromes (they have all the aerodrome country they need in and around Lae, on the flats at the mouth of the Mark ham), but was to provide an advanced camp, from which they could try to get through the mountains into the Bulolo Valley, where there are a number of use ful airfields. The Wau drome is one of the best in New Guinea.

But it may be taken as certain that the Australian jungle fighters in that part of New Guinea have rendered the Bulolo Valley airfields useless to the Japanese, and the Japanese could only make use of them if they could somehow get ground forces into the Bulolo Valley, to drive out any Australian forces there, and restore the aerodromes. From what I know of the country, and of the calibre of the Australian men who comprise our jungle fighters, I think we need not fear any Japanese ground parties who may get through those incredible moun tains into the Bulolo Valley.

Salamaua Airfield Smashed

IT should be explained that the Sala maua drome is not a first-class one.

The Lae and Salamaua dromes are only eighteen miles apart. Guinea Air ways established the Lae drome on the flats at the mouth of the Markham River, where there is no port, because the country around the port of Salamaua, which was the most convenient place for the drome, was generally swampy, and rises very abruptly into the coastal chain

of mountains. People, for years, despaired of making a good airfield at Salamaua.

It was done, eventually, but it was built on swampy ground, and is surrounded by swamps.

After the smashing which the Salamaua drome has had recently, and in the rainy season which New Guinea is now experiencing, I imagine that the Sala maua drome is practically unusable. In any event, it is not a good drome, because it is tucked in too closely under the overhanging mountains, and is always a headache to pilots inexperienced in New Guinea flying.

Can They Attack Pt. Moresby?

rpHE position is that the Japanese air X forces on the New Guinea mainland are being largely confined to Lae— and, while the Lae drome is good, the Lae region is vulnerable to attack by experienced pilots, who can descend upon it out of the clouds which nearly always enwrap the tops of the 7,000 feet high mountains behind Salamaua, and which often extend right back to the Central Range.

If the Japanese wish to attack Port Moresby from New Guinea, they must employ their famous leap-frog tactics, advancing step by step along the coastal fringe of Papua from the region of Samarai. Such tactics would call for large air and naval forces—and already the Australian and American fighters defending this area have given such proof of their quality that it is unlikely that the Japanese will lightly enter upon such an adventure.

It is argued by some that the Japs could get through from Buna to Kokoda, and thence to Port Moresby. But I do not think that the Kokoda-Port Moresby road is militarily practicable.

Japs At Santa Cruz

npHE Japanese occupation of the large X island of Santa Cruz (in the Santa Cruz Group, between the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides) may be merely an advanced base for purpose of reconnaissance, or an indication that the Japanese, employing the islands-landing technique which was so successful in the East Indies, are planning an advance through the Solomons, New Hebrides, Fiji, etc., towards New Zealand.

Although Santa Cruz is seldom heard of in Australia, the fact that it has been selected by the Japanese for occupation indicates the thoroughness of the surveys which Japan stealthily made of all the South Sea Islands during the past two decades. The Japanese knew that Santa Cruz has a big, safe harbour, where large ships may lie—namely, Graciosa Bay just as they knew all about Kieta (Bou gainville), and that fine, deep port (Carola Harbour) on the west coast of Buka, where they have established some sort of base. nrSI h iu,ot he^Sp^nis s ex P ed ition under Don Alvaro de Mendana set out to re locate the Solomon Islands (the reputed source of King Solomon’s gold), in 1567, the ships got somewhat off the course and came instead to the Santa Cruz S! P m £ the Spaniards established their colony on Graciosa Bay. That tr ? g l c histor y- It was even *wily Jl lped ?Ht »y sickness and blood sned (the natives then were extremely hp U a C rH le nf f and 9L raciosa Ba y was not heard of for another 250 years. Thirty were o est a hlf?hpri ag °’ coconut Plantations were established on Graciosa Bay bv the Ca P tain . Svensen, and these later became a station of Levers Pacific Plantations Pty. Ltd. Later, however the island was abandoned by British enter ™^™an^ fan 3. ous in Pacific history (Com modore Goodenough) was murdered by natives in Graciosa Bay in 1875, and an

obelisk there commemorates his memory.

Graciosa Bay, in Santa Cruz Island, therefore, has been the scene of tragedies, suffered by a series of visitors. Without wishing the Japanese any special harm, we may hope that the hoodoo that apparently is upon the place has not been broken.