Disaster At

Hawaii

How Lazy Officialdom Gave Japs a Flying Start

SOME may wonder why the Japanese have been permitted to over-run Hongkong, Philippines, Malava Borneo and New Guinea, without much interference from the naval and air forces of the United States, supposed to be rTl s ase T d on Pearl Harbour, Hawaii.

The Japanese have had their way with us because, in the dawn of December 7 menc l n J orces in Hawaii were so badly smashed or crippled that they could not function, as had been planned 7 It is a terrible story of official careless ness, laziness and inefficiency. il S that the Japanese surprise attack should never have succeeded, and the two chiefs responsible for Pearl Har bour defence Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short, have been ignommiously sacked. But that is small consolation for the thousands of people ruined by the Japanese invasion of British and American Territories .Si, report . °£ . the us B °ard which officially inquired into the Pearl Harbour disaster reconstructed the whole set of circumstances.

PLANS to meet just such an attack as the Japs carried out—a surprise attack by clouds of planes from aircraft carriers—had been made and were in the commanders’ hands. Prom November 27 onwards, Washington gave Hawaii warnings of what to expect, and there should have been constant vigilance on ships and shore, and a ceaseless aerial reconnaissance far to seaward.

Instead, Hawaii officialdom was quite sure that, if Japan attacked, the attack would come in the Far East. Admiral and General did not consult each other High officers insisted that local precau tions were the responsibility of the other fellow. All were contemptuous of any thing the Jans might do.

The air-raid warning system had not been completed. No dispositions were made to meet a surprise attack. Army aircraft, instead of being widely dispersed, were bunched on the airport for the con venience of those guarding them against sabotage, where they were a sitting shot for enemy bombers, and they suffered enormous destruction.

THE American forces in Hawaii, in the good old democratic way, “liked to have their weekends free”. They trained hard during the week; but army, navy and air force insisted on having liberal weekend leave between Saturday morning and Monday.

There are over 160,000 Japanese in Hawaii (two thirds of them born there and officially “American citizens”, but every single one of them a slave of the Jap. Emperor); and all Japanese, by birth and habit, are spies. America knows now, what all well-informed people knew years ago, that the American defence system in Hawaii was under a most com plete system of Japanese espionage. The Japs knew all about navy and army dis positions, and about the American week end holiday.

They knew something that even Washington did not know—that during the sacred weekend, there were no naval or aerial reconnaissances over the ad joining ocean.

So the’Japs launched a perfectly-timed attack from aircraft carriers, which crept

up under cover of the sacred weekend, and, at dusk on Saturday night, December 6, they were within 200 miles of Pearl Harbour. At dawn on Sunday, December 7, they launched fleets of bombers and torpedo-carriers. , , . A1 ..

The attack had been planned with the most complete detail. Every airman was equipped with a clear map (the result of successful espionage), and each had his exact, allotted task. The maps showed airfields, barracks, the berths of big ships. Surprise was the prime essential.

Surprise meant success. But if the Americans were forewarned and ready, the Jap. attackers could be almost an nihilated, and the Americans would enter the new war with their enormous Pacific strength practically unimpaired.

LUCK was with the Japanese in the shape of the wellnigh incredible stupidity of peace-softened American officers. . J .

An American destroyer and a patrol plane, an hour before the Jap. attack came, discovered and sank a small Japan ese submarine just outside of Pearl Harbour. The “incident” was reported to the naval base, but the naval base or dered no alert. Officialdom was not going to disturb its sacred weekend.

Fifteen minutes later, and 45 minutes before the Jap. attack came, a non commissioned officer operating a sound detector located a large flight of planes 130 miles away, to the north-eastward.

The NCO reported to a young lieutenant.

The latter, in his wisdom, decided that they must be “friendly planes”, and did nothing.

And so the attack came, soon after dawn. The Japanese used four aircraft carriers, between 150 and 200 planes, an undetermined number of supporting sur face craft, and a few small submarines.

Torpedo planes caused most damage to ships in the harbour.

No words can exaggerate the havoc wrought, and the fearful confusion which reigned. The Japanese “caught the Ameri cans with their pants down”, and the Americans took the worst hiding in their

history. . . m

It is no use mincing words. The des truction done to the naval base, to large and small warships, to airfields and air craft, was so great that it completely dislocated all American plans for meeting an attack by Japan in the North Pacific; and— combined with the equally tragic loss of the “Prince of Wales” and “Re pulse” off Malaya—it set back by months the date when we, in these beleaguered British islands, can expect to see the Stars and Stripes chasing the Rising Sun back into the north.