The news magazine of the South Pacific · since 1930

Pacific Islands Monthly, 16 February 1942Vol. XII, No. 7

World-War In The Pacific

pp. 7-8 · Read in the full issue

Progress of Events and What They Signify

THE following is a summary of events and developments in the Pacific War, from the conclusion of our summary published on page 4 of the January issue, up until February 14.

Between December 7 and January 14 (when our last .summary closed) Japan had had the following initial successes. They included; —

Smashing of Pearl Harbour base.

Destruction of British warships off Malaya.

Seizure of Guam and Wake Island.

Capture of Hongkong.

Occupation of Thailand.

Seizure of Northern Malaya.

Partial occupation of the Philippines.

Partial occupation of North Borneo.

Attacks on Nauru, Ocean Island and Northern Gilberts.

Bombing of Rabaul.

Since January 14 the Japanese have had a further series of suc cesses, which have strengthened their strategical situation. They are as follow: —

Jaoan has occupied the whole of Malaya, driving the British back to the fit of Sineanore.

S Japan occupied Singapore Island, and the capture by the Japanese ° a t matt < fr r o a f t h7u V rs l See ” ,S ° n ' y Japanese armies, driving westwards from Thailand, have occupied Eastern Japanese now have occupied practically the whole of Philippines, Borneo, and

Celebes.

Japanese have captured and °<L cu Pjed the important East Indies base of Am boina; and. from the hne of Celebes-Amboma, they now are threate and occupied the eastern portion (Ra* 3s^ l ’ New and New Ueland^ threatening Port Moresby and Torres Strait.

Compared with the previous month, Japan’s advances in the month under review are comparatively small, but they are extemely important.

Details of the above are given on pages 1 and 2, and the general situation and apparent aims of Japanese strategy are explained in our mam article on page 5.

Allies’ Apparent Plan

AN examination of the map on the front cover of this journal will show the general situation. Now that it is apparent that the British are not at tempting to hold Singapore, it is possible to get some indication of Allied strategy.

There are indications that the general plan of the Allies is as follows: Very powerful Allied armies will be built up in Burma to co-operate with the very large, but poorly-equipped armies of China, in a great eastwards drive from Burma and China towards the coast of the China Sea. .

Strong forces including, especially, American air forces —will be assembled m Java and Sumatra, in an endeavour to keep the Jap. invaders on their present line. Since the value of Singapore as a naval base was destroyed by the Japanese seizure of Malaya, the retention of Singa pore apparently is not envisaged by the Allies in this general plan. It is probable that all this fighting in Malaya and Singapore will be seen, in future, as little better than a delaying action, while the Allies gather great forces m Java ana Sumatra to resist the invader more will be used as the main base for the Allied forces defending the Southern Pacific front, just as India is being used as the main base forthe armies defending the Western Pacific front (Burma, China, etc.).

Meanwhile, assuming that the, Burma East Indies-North Australia line indicated can be held, the efforts of the Americans probably will be concentrated upon. tD Sending adequate supplies to assist Aus tralians on the Northern Australian fron , the Dutch in the East Indies, and Jhe British and Chinese in Burma and China, (2) Directing naval and air attacks upon the Japanese bases along what may be called Japan’s Eastern p acifi c which extends from Eastern New Gumea, north-eastwards through the Marshalls and Marianas, to Formosa an ?, ’ (3) Developing a powerful attack oy

naval, air and military forces through Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, upon Northern Japan—perhaps without Rus sian assistance, but, we hope, with Russian co-operation.

It is necessary to have a large-scale map of the whole Pacific to envisage this Allied strategy; but, when it is seen, it will be recognised as offering some real hope in regard to the future.

The Immediate Outlook

A PRIMARY consideration of the suc cess of such a plan is that we shall be able to withstand the ferocious attacks and steady advances of the Japanese forces thrusting southwards and westwards from the strong line of the territories which they now occupy.

We know that vast Allied forces are gathering, and will continue to gather, during the rest of this year. And, while it is disconcerting that, as yet, they have given no indication of their strength and prowess in the Pacific war area, it is comforting, in another way, to believe that it is part of the grand Allied strategy to “take” the present blows, and accept all these disasters in silence, while we withhold our strength, and build it up to the point where our blows, when de livered, will secure maximum success Anyone can see that Japan, m her present situation, is amazingly vulnerable.

Long lines of communications, stretched out from Japan over thousands of miles, southwards and south-westwards, are simply inviting attack from air and sea.

But the Japanese are very sure of their strength, amazingly confident of their general strategical plan, and remarkably contemptuous of what the United States and Britain now can do to them. We can only wait and see.

The keys to the immediate outlook lie now in the following places, namely:—

Singapore And East Indies:

Singapore virtually is lost —at any rate, it has very little use, now, for defence, and the only thing that will prevent this defeat from becoming a serious disaster will be the successful defence of Java

and Sumatra. Therefore, events in those two great islands during the next month will have much significance.

New Guinea And North Aus

TRALIA; Japan is certain to seek the capture of Port Moresby, basing her attack upon Rabaul, and possibly on Samarai. If she can get Port Moresby she can close Torres Strait, with the dire consequences indicated on Page 5.

BURMA AND CHINA; In an attempt to cut the Burma Road (China’s supply line) and to disrupt the Allies’ plan for building up a great offensive in* Burma, the Japanese will certainly attack west wards from the position they have taken up along the Salween River. The conse quences of this battle will also be important.

ALEUTIAN ISLANDS: The develop ment of American naval and air attack upon Japanese bases along Japan’s Eastern Pacific front, and signs of an American offensive based on the Aleutian Islands, on the North Pacific front, may not be expected until the situation on the North Australian-East Indies-Burma fronts is stabilised, and until the northern summer comes. It must be remembered that at present the Northern Pacific, and especially the far northern Aleutian Is lands, are now in the grip of winter.

The Russo-German situation also has a bearing upon Allied strategy in the Pacific. Russia is supposed to be willing to help the Allies, from Siberia; but, em phatically, Russia is not going to open up a new fighting front against the Japanese until she is sure that all her military resources are not required in her large-scale war against Germany.