Problems Of Aerial Defence

In The Pacific

U S. Navy, In Great Manoeuvres, Loses Six Bombers and 31 Men

By John Williams.

Honolulu, Apr. 20.

THE execution of. Problem 19, the an num war games of the U.S. Pacific fleet just concluded, paid particular attention to the uses of aircraft in navy attack and defence tactics.

Something like 600 navy warplanes, ranging from high speed single-seater fighters, that are nothing but flying ma chine guns, to longe-range coastal patrol bombers that virtually are flying “poc ket” fortresses, were engaged.

According to what the admirals have to say, America must revise some of her aerial strategy, and make up what they call “certain deficiencies”, meaning that some of the equipment isn’t all that it is cracked up to be, and that other equip

ment, such as better basing facilities, is lacking.

To start with, America has heavy-ped alled the possibilities of aircraft, and probably it can be safely claimed that with aircraft the U.S. navy is the best equipped in the world—if numbers mean anything.

Outstanding theory that was tested, a test that involved the best equipment available, called for the long-range pa trol bombers to fly out from their shore bases and perform some of the duties of scouting destroyers. That is, locate and report the enemy, repel enemy aircraft attack, and report the fall of warship gunfire. The theory was announced last November by the admirals based at San Diego (Southern California).

FMRST week in January, the fleet put to sea £or a local shake-down test of the theory. Things didn’t go so well.

A patrol bomber, with crew of seven, completely vanished during a scouting pa trol. It did not send out a radio warn ing of impending disaster. It just van ished, and no trace was found, although 35 warships and 284 warplanes combed an area of 60,000 sq. miles.

Month later, the fleet put to sea again, lall set to test the “aerial destroyer” theory. Ninety-eight warships ploughed out through rain-swept seas, under simu lated war conditions, which mean lights out. Only the roar of 40 patrol bombers scouting through the storm overhead be trayed the intensity of the manoeuvre.

Again there was no warning. Sudden ly a ball of flame burst in the rain-dren ched sky. It streamed sickeningly to ward the sea. Searchlights lighted the scene, ships swung toward the spot where the flaming ball had exploded into smith ereens.

Of the 14 airmen who had tested a theory in self-imposed darkness, only three were saved. It was the navy’s worst aircraft disaster in history. Total dead for three weeks: 18.

THEN followed Problem 19, the war games that covered one-fifth of the Pacific, employing 160 warships, 600 warplanes and 60,000 officers and men, the greatest display of naval might ever seen in the Pacific area. The navy’s “eyes” saw all the ocean between die Aleutian Islands and American Samoa, which subjected the equipment to gruel ling tests under climatic conditions vary ing from sub-Arctic to equatorial tem peratures.

Major “game” was a simulated war conditions’ attack upon the Island of Oahu, the main island of the Hawaii Group. Undismayed by the aerial disas ters near San Diego, the strategists worked out a defence of Oahu which in cluded a long-range patrol of the coast by squadrons of the latest twin-engined bombers. The weather was rough; in termittent coastal rains, good average winds, mediocre visibility. Surface ves sels can take things easy, stand to u? squalls, especially when they are steam ing fast in formation. But with the bomb ers trapped in these squalls, and flying

at 150 m.p.h. near the coast, with its towering hills and turbulent air, it was an entirely different—and terrifying— story.

Bombers haven’t much choice in squalls. Formations have to be broken up and it is a case of every ’plane for itself. On paper, of course, the bombers function differently. Win-the-next-warin-the-air advocates give too much eredit to ’planes. They imagine that these rugged bombers, for example, can sit down on the ocean and mark time until fhe squalls pass and then take off again.

The designers naturally make the bombers as strong as they can within the weight limitations.

Not from choice, but from sheer urgent necessity, some of the Problem 19 bombers defending Oahu tried emergency landings at sea to save themselves from impending disaster in local storms. This is what happened:— One bomber “sat down” at sea in a squall. The pounding of the waves opened up its metal hull. It sank. The crew escaped in lifebelts. A warship happened to be near. The men were saved.

Almost on the same spot another bomber sat down. This was the next day: the sea was smoother. During these war games th,e bombers were not allowed to use their radio unless in dire emerg ency. The radio would give away their position to the alert listening “enemy”, The second bomber was taken in tow and returned safely to its base. Both these incidents happened in daylight. If at night, it might have been an entirely dif ferent story.

Newspaper reporters could get no sat isfaction from the admirals as to why the Grubers had not used their radio, mwo nights later, a bomber was skim j. ming Honolulu’s rooftops, which thrilled the residents, but it had to continue on round the coast where it flew slap-bang into a squall. One of its engines spluttered. The pilot took no risks. He sat down inside a coral reef.

An army encampment nearby switched on two searchlights, and in their beam took place a thrilling fight to save the 18-ton bomber from disaster on the reef, A coastguard cutter slid through the

wild surf and took the bomber in tow, a long haul back to its base.

Next day a bomber formation was only 10 miles from its base. A squall engulf ed the formation. The pilots lost no time.

Three of the bombers were set down just beyond the surf, at famed Waikiki, much to the astonishment of thousands of swimmers. Another landed in Hono lulu harbour, still another in a small yacht harbour. When the squall passed, they took off and returned to their base.

Too large to enter Pearl Harbour Navy Base, Hawaii, the U.S. aircraft carriers “Saratoga” (left), “Lexington”, and “Ranger”, lie off Honolulu in the roadstead. Diamond Head, the Army’s potent fortress, looms in the background.

The most dramatic episode was reserv ed for the last day: March 30. Two bombers, while on coastal patrol, were caught in squalls and were not seen again by their companion bombers. Only one has been located: it was found drifting, a tangled mess, five dead. In spite of the “greatest mass air search” in Hawaii history, no trace, except partially burned clothing, has been found of the other bomber: seven dead.

THIS compelled the navy really to do sorfiething about aircraft theories.

With the same secrecy that nad cloaked the war games, a probe was set going at Pearl Harbour navy base. A board composed of an admiral and some air experts spent three weeks in listen ing to testimony. Rear-Admiral Charles A. Blakely, who is based at San Diego in charge of the navy’s aircraft scouting

force, hurried from California to “ob serve” the proceedings of the secret board.

No public announcement will be made about the outcome of the probe: after all, it is a confidential strategy matter.

However, the taxpayers are concerned about the 31 flying men killed within three months and the wiping out of some 1,500,000 dollars worth of equipment.

Reliable official sources off the record forecast that the probe will result in one of the navy’s biggest shakeups in years; that the present system of navy aircraft being sometimes controlled by ranking of ficers with little or no training in avi ation will cease; that the navy’s air arm will be run by aircraft-trained officers; that there will be more regard for the definite limitations of aircraft in future war games and in the development of strategy for America’s defence.

The secret probe’s testimony has amply proved that patrol bombers and other navy aircraft depend for completely safe flying upon all those radio aids which are vital in the operation of commercial air craft. Aircraft are fine weather imple ments of defence: they must be able to “see”, or else be taken care of by radio aids. In war, aircraft radio aids will be jammed and distorted.

NO secrecy was attached to another im portant aspect of America’s naval air craft defence. Problem 19 definitely proved that the San Diego and Pearl Harbour navy bases, as they stand to-day, are insufficient for the ever-increasing Pacific fleet forces.

For example, the aircraft carriers “Lex ington”, “Saratoga” and “Ranger” are too bulky and unwieldy to enter Pearl Harbour with the rest of the fleet. They are compelled to anchor off the port of Honolulu. There is only one entrance channel to Pearl Harbour. Rear-Admiral Joseph K. Taussig was outspoken about this point. He said other entrance chan nels must be considered.

Three more aircraft carriers, the “Wasp”, “Yorktown” and “Enterprise”, are expected to be in the Pacific service within the next 12 months.

An important result of this is expected to be the permanent basing of one of the carriers in Hawaiian waters, which to-day are patrolled solely by submarines and destroyers and, of course, patrol bombers.

This will cause a revision of defence strategy. It is said that the presence of 100 high-speed naval fighting ’planes in Hawaii, which a carrier would mean, will give the patrol bomber force greater con fidence —which means more effectiveness.