Editorial Note

rpHE inferences of the judge’s statement are clear.

The Crown Law Officer is Mr. Gerald Hogan, and Mr. Hogan is a Roman Catholic. It is suggested that Mr. Hogan, consciously or unconsciously, tried to protect the Catholic Missionary to some

extent by making the charge one of man slaughter instead of murder.

If that were so, it was—as the judge said —a grave misuse of power. But if, as seems apparent, there is to be “an official inquiry” into the matter, every man who is a friend of decency and jus tice in public life should use his influence to prevent Mr. Hogan being pilloried by Judge Wanliss and officialdom.

It must be remembered that when the case against Brother Zimmer was being prepared, the New Guinea community, and especially the Roman Catholic sec tion of it, had been profoundly shocked by the savagery of the sentence imposed by Judge Wanliss upon Father Cranssen.

It can be quite understood that Mr.

Hogan, an experienced legal man of moderate views, regarded the Cranssen sentence with horror. In the circum stances, he could have had no confidence in the kind of justice dispensed by Judge Wanliss’s court; and it is understand able, and even excusable, that he used his power to frame the charge in such a way that the unfortunate missionary might be protected against the risk of another ferocious sentence.

The Crown Law Officer’s conduct may have been wrong. But the wrong was done out of good motives—desire to pro tect a misguided man against injustice masquerading as justice. If wrong was done, Judge Wanliss must share the re sponsibility for it, because of the error he made in sentencing Cranssen. That is the logical meaning of the verdict of the High Court.

Rather than inquire about Mr. Hogan’s conduct, the authorities should give some thought to the menace to peace and good government, represented in this jury less court, and the character of the sen tences imposed by Judge Wanliss.

Judge Wanliss is a clever man, a clear thinking jurist. But there is no quality of mercy in his sentences, and it is not said of him, even by his best friends, that he has ever displayed charity and a human understanding of the curious con ditions of life in the tropics. He simply is the logical, implacable instrument of the law. Those qualities might serve well on the Bench of a high court in a Euro pean country. But much more is needed in a tropical country, where the majority of permanent European residents are far from normal, and where the president of the court is both jury and judge.

Judge Wanliss has constituted himself a kind of arbiter of morals and conduct

in the Territory. He frequently delivers, from the Bench, a lecture wherein the conduct of the delinquent is condemned in stern and measured terms, and wherein there is no sign of tolerance for the weak ness of human nature or understanding of the abnormal character of tropical life; and then he inflicts a punishment that reflects the heat of his personal in dignation. The Cranssen case provided an example of it; and the Larkin case provides another. This judge found Lar kin guilty of murder when it was clearly a case of manslaughter; he scolded Lar kin from the Bench; and then he imposed the monstrous sentence of ten years’ hard labour. In view of the Cranssen develop ment, it is inevitable that the Larkin case will receive official attention at an early date.

If the Supreme Court in New Guinea is to continue as a non-jury court, it seems certain that the people there will demand some limitation of the power of Judge Wanliss. The significance of that High Court decision cannot be ignored.