The Future Of The New Hebrides.

is no reason, national, economic, or strat egic, why France should wish to retain her hold on the New Hebrides. As an imperial proposition, there is more than one reason why Britain and France should quite amicably adjust their territorial differences between Africa, Asia and the South Pacific.

There are two great colonial empires in the world —that of Britain and that of France. The British Empire is scattered over the surface of the globe— an extraordinary mixture of territorial bits and pieces—but its administration, development and pro tection are quite practicable and reasonably simple, because of Britain’s marine strength, and the exist ence of the British oversea dominions, abutting on every ocean.

The French Empire, on the other hand, consists mostly of large continental masses—slices of Asia and South America, and a very large portion of Africa. Except for Cochin China and the South Pacific Islands, the colonial possessions of France can be—and are—very efficiently administered from

Paris direct, and may be protected by French mili tary power, and the strength of the French navy in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Therefore, it would be to the advantage of the French Empire, and would strengthen France in a strategic sense, if French territorial interests in the Pacific were ex changed for interests which could be linked up with French possessions in Africa or Asia.

This is not the opinion only of this journal. It is the argument also of a brilliant French officer and strategist, Admiral Castex, and it is set out in the third volume of his notable work, Theories Strategique. We find it quoted with approval by a writer in the January number of L’Oceanic Franraise, which is the Bulletin of the Committee of French Oceania, published in Paris.

Admiral Castex has made a careful study of the prob lem of developing and protecting the great Colonial Empire of France, and he takes the view that some of the French colonies—and particularly those in the Pacific—are a weakness and a danger to France as, in the event of an international war in which France could not command the Pacific Ocean, they would all be lost, as it would be impossible to defend them.

The Admiral urges France to concentrate her col onising activities in as few continents as possible, and to exchange her colonial interests elsewhere for new lands—in Africa, if practicable. He makes an interesting summary of the position in the South Seas.

In the course of his argument, Admiral Castex asks what imperial need is served by France retail ing her possessions in the Pacific. They are not re quired by economic interests nor in the interests of naval expansion. The acquirement of these Pacific territories, he says, was simply the result of rivalry between the Catholic missionaries of France, and the Protestant English missionaries of the London Mis sionary Society. Out of that arose the celebrated “affaire Pritchard,” as a result of which the French admiral, Dupetit-Thouars, annexed the Society Is lands in 1842, and the Marquesas, Gambier, Tuam otus, etc., in 1844. In 1853, Admiral Febvrier-Des pointes, in somewhat similar circumstances, raised the French flag in New Caledonia, which became a penal settlement between 1864 and 1896. In later times, France took possession of Wallis Island in 1912, and became a party to the establishment of the Condominium in the New Hebrides.

Admiral Castex declares that these several Pacific Groups are of little, if any, economic value to France.

Tahiti is French in title, but is American in regard to commercial affairs, and is a happy hunting-ground for American tourists and Protestant missionaries. What does not belong to American interests has been taken up by the Chinese. It is a beautiful and pleasant place to which to send French officials, and a fav ourite resort of writers and artists —but it is of little use to France. So far as New Caledonia is con cerned, says this writer, there is no question about its mineral riches, but the discontinuance of the deportation of criminals, and the decision to make it a colony for French freed convicts, have created a serious difficulty in regard to labour supplies for the mines, and much of the earlier promise of this colony has disappeared. A happier note is found in New Hebrides, where there has been remarkable de velopment; but this Group, says the admiral, “does not belong entirely to us, and Australia views with impatience our presence in that archipelago.”

The admiral proceeds: “The possibility of success fully defending these Pacific possessions is quite evi dently nil, owing to their distance and, owing to the naval effort that would be required to maintain com munication with them by sea. They are at the mercy of the United States, and the Australian Common

wealth, and of New Zealand, and their probable fate is clearly shown by what happened to New Guinea and Samoa when war broke out in 1914.”

For this reason, urges the admiral, it should not be difficult to make a satisfactory exchange of these Islands’ territories, which are very attractive to Australia and New Zealand, for territory in other parts of the world, which can be much more profit ably developed and defended by French Colonial administration.

We could not state the case more strongly than it has been presented by this French officer. The New Hebrides and New Caledonia mean little to France, commercially strategically, because of their distance from the' Mother Country, and because they are not near or on the way to any other French possession. But the two groups are of much import ance to Australia, because they are in close trading contact with the Australian territories, and because they form a part of that protective fringe of islands which stretch across thousands of miles of ocean, and interpose a barrier between Australia and the rest of the Pacific.

Much the same thing applies to French Oceania in relation to New Zealand; although New Zealand’s interests in Tahiti are not nearly so extensive and intimate as are those of Australia in New Hebrides and New Caledonia. It was hoped that, when the Panama Canal was opened, France might have done something to bring about settlement and develop ment in the Society, Tuamotu and Marquesas groups; but little has been done in that direction.

The territories concerned would lose nothing, there fore, and might possibly gain, by a change of ad ministration.

The only obstacle in the way of an amicable dis cussion of these matters between France and Britain, and a mutually satisfactory adjustment, is French national pride, and age-old suspicion of “perfidious Albion.” We have before us, for instance, a copy of “Le Neo Hebridais”—that excellent French news paper published in Vila —in which the editor spirit edly replies to our recent suggestion that it was time to consider the position and future of the New Heb rides. He sees the hand of the Presbyterian mission ary in our recent article; he insists (what is quite true) that French interests are predominant in the group; and he reminds us that France is “court eously” accepting the £ sterling and the £ Aus tralian in the group at par, and ignoring the fact that they are actually worth much less. This, also, is true; but we seem to recollect that Britain treated the franc with similar consideration when the exchange position was reversed some ten years ago.

All this, however, is beside the point. We must seek the big, imperial view—not the selfish, parochial one —and the big view has been very effectively pre sented by the French writer (Admiral Castex) from whom we have quoted.